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VU University Amsterdam and University of Oxford
We use the concept of niche construction—the process whereby individuals, through
their activities, interactions, and choices, modify their own and each other’s environ-
ments—as an example of how biological evolution and cultural evolution interacted to
form an integrative foundation of modern organizational leadership. Resulting adapta-
tions are formal structures that facilitate coordination of large, postagrarian organiza-
tional networks. We provide three propositions explaining how leadership processes
evolve over time within and between organizations in order to solve specific coordination
problems. We highlight the balancing act between self-interests and group interests in
organizations and show how leadership must regulate this tension to maintain organiza-
tional fitness. We conclude with predictions about the future evolution of leadership in
organizations.
Leadership is an important factor contributing
to organizational success, yet after centuries of
inquiry, leadership theory remains underdevel-
oped. In response, scholars are generating a
growing body of literature on leadership in their
attempt to create a more unified theory by high-
lighting evolutionary processes that are ger-
mane to both the biological and cultural dimen-
sions of human behavior (e.g., Nicholson, 2011;
Spisak, Nicholson, & van Vugt, 2011; van Vugt,
Hogan, & Kaiser, 2008). These initiatives fit com-
fortably with Suddaby, Hardy, and Huy’s (2011:
244) point that “it is now time for less consolida-
tion and more provocation” in theory develop-
ment in the organizational sciences. In this ar-
ticle we combine insights derived from
biological science with existing organizational
theory to model the evolution of leadership and
its impact on organizational change.
Our contribution focuses on integrated theory
building, where multiple elements of the lead-
ership phenomenon, such as individual agents,
context, and dynamic interactions, are consid-
ered simultaneously (e.g., Avolio, 2007; Lord,
Brown, Harvey, & Hall, 2001). In existing theories
scholars have been slow to adopt this approach.
One problem is a focus on near-term “how”
questions, as opposed to ultimate “why” ques-
tions concerning leader-follower motives and
interactions. Instead of asking questions regard-
ing “how transformational and transactional
leadership dimensions differ” (e.g., Judge & Pic-
colo, 2004), we seek to analyze “why different
leadership behaviors emerge in the first
place”—a question that requires a deeper con-
sideration of leadership as an evolving process.
A related issue is the scarcity of interdisciplin-
ary treatments, where new concepts and ap-
proaches are brought into the fold of traditional
perspectives. This deficit can promote signifi-
cant miscalculations of organizational manage-
ment. For example, previous theories focusing
primarily on rational agency overlook the non-
economic complexities of the manager-subordi-
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nate interaction (Davis, Schoorman, & Donald-
son, 1997).
Integrated theory building also moves ana-
lytic interest well past excessive “gap spotting”
(Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011), which tends to gen-
erate suboptimal theory because it underplays
the dynamic nature of leadership in organiza-
tions (Avolio, 2007; Whetten, 1989). As a conse-
quence of this shortcoming, scholars often frame
leadership more in person than in process
terms, inviting fundamental attribution errors,
such as emphasizing the causal effect of spe-
cific leaders on coordination to the exclusion of
other situational factors like group size (see We-
ber, Camerer, Rottenstreich, & Knez, 2001). Schol-
ars also tend to focus attention more proxi-
mately on how leadership operates in a given
context, rather than on the complex dynamics
linking these individual observations (for an ex-
ception see Uhl-Bien, Marion, & McKelvey, 2007).
Thus, a static approach makes it difficult to ac-
count for the changing nature of the organiza-
tional environment.
Solving these problems requires us to con-
sider how and why varying forms of leadership
develop across organizations over time. We
adopt the perspective that evolution has en-
dowed humans with attributes and capabilities
that govern how we interact with one another
in organizations (e.g., Pierce & White, 1999). In
this view cultural evolution is an adaptive
extension of biological evolution (Boyd & Rich-
erson, 1985; Durham, 1991; Laland & Brown, 2011;
Mesoudi, 2011), with both being governed by the
same processes: variation, heritability, and se-
lection. Over time, adaptations will encode bio-
logically—such as an instinctive ability and de-
sire to lead and to follow—if selective pressures
are strong, consistent, and persistent. Other evo-
lutionary mechanisms will play out culturally
over a shorter time span—for example, manage-
ment adopting hierarchical versus flat leader-
ship structures to coordinate successfully.
This biology-culture connection provides us
with a clear set of evolutionary principles to
analyze simultaneously proximate, short-term
leadership issues as well as longer-range dy-
namics. This, in turn, takes us to the develop-
ment of a recursive predictive model: specific
leadership traits will be selected for in a partic-
ular organizational niche, and the emergent
leadership will, over time, modify that niche and
codirect organizational change. Leadership is
therefore a dual process that emerges from
and is the constructor of the organizational
environment.
Our model is based on the premise that lead-
ership is a biologically and culturally adaptive
process that serves social systems by coordinat-
ing and directing effort (van Vugt et al., 2008).
The ability to form cohesive groups that effec-
tively coordinate to achieve mutual goals can
ultimately enhance fitness (Couzin, Krause,
Franks, & Levin, 2005; Flack, Girvan, de Waal, &
Krakauer, 2006; Harcourt, Ang, Sweetman, John-
stone, & Manica, 2009). However, organizing the
efforts of groups—that is, interdependent indi-
viduals who share social identities and have
common interests—comes with costs and risks.
For example, if “group” is defined at the organi-
zational level, then transaction costs of coordi-
nation are high because of the increased likeli-
hood of divergent incentives and routines
among individuals and subgroups (Ren, Kiesler,
& Fussell, 2008). An example is the different
“pulls” that emerge from competing agendas
within some matrix-managed businesses. Firms
are continually under pressure to manage such
organizational challenges (Gulati & Singh,
1998). Should a firm, for instance, exploit a well-
established niche or invest in exploration of a
new market for fear of becoming obsolete
(March 1991)? The risks associated with an in-
creasing number of these coordination problems
can spark damaging conflicts over collective ac-
tion decisions. It is the presence of such recur-
rent dilemmas in the environment that selects
for adaptive solutions (e.g., Nowak & Sig-
mund, 2005).
Thus, leadership can be defined initially as
an adaptive process where one or more individ-
uals emerge as a focal point to influence and
coordinate behavior for solving social chal-
lenges posed by dynamic physical and cultural
environments (Hogan, Curphy, & Hogan, 1994;
King, Johnson, & van Vugt, 2009; Nicholson, 2013;
van Vugt, 2006; van Vugt et al., 2008). Indeed,
over evolutionary time, environmental pres-
sures facing human groups, such as intergroup
conflict, appear to have selected for leadership
as one of the principal devices for achieving
social coordination (e.g., Pearce, Conger, &
Locke, 2007; van Vugt, 2006; Vaughn, Eerkens, &
Kantner, 2010). In short, the interplay between
leadership and followership is a distinctly so-
cial process that addresses the critical issues of
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survival and reproduction (Kenrick, Li, & Butner,
2003; Sober & Wilson, 1998).
This argument in its general form is neither
unique nor revolutionary. However, a particular
developmental process of leadership has lacked
attention—the evolutionary shift from hunting
and gathering to agriculture (Richerson, Boyd, &
Bettinger, 2001; Rowley-Conwy & Layton, 2011)
and the postagrarian organizational transfor-
mations that resulted in a multiplicity of leader-
ship structures. Investigating this evolutionary
trajectory helps to clarify the role of leadership
within the organizational processes of coevolu-
tion and niche construction, both as an agent of
selection and change and as an object of these
processes. In lay terms, leaders make history
and history makes leaders (Nicholson, 2013).
NICHE CONSTRUCTION THEORY
IN ORGANIZATIONS
A framework for understanding the coevolu-
tionary nature of leadership and organizations
is niche construction theory (NCT), a young
branch of evolutionary biology that has become
a multidisciplinary movement involving evolu-
tionary biologists, ecologists, psychologists, an-
thropologists, archeologists, computer scien-
tists, philosophers, and others (Kendal, Tehrani,
& Odling-Smee, 2011; Laland & O’Brien, 2011).
Proponents of NCT have a fundamentally differ-
ent view of how niches are constructed from that
typically found in the social and biological sci-
ences (e.g., Chase & Leibold, 2003). In contrast to
traditional theories of evolution, in which re-
searchers view organisms as molded by envi-
ronmental pressures, NCT provides a second
route to the adaptive fit between organism and
environment by emphasizing the capacity of
species to modify environmental states. Niche
construction theorists propose that, in modifying
their own world, organisms frequently modify
the environments of other organisms that share
those environments. When beavers build dams,
for example, they affect considerably more than
the probability that genes for dam building will
spread. They also modify nutrient cycling and
decomposition dynamics, influence the charac-
ter of water and materials transported down-
stream, and ultimately influence plant and com-
munity composition and diversity (Naiman,
Johnston, & Kelley, 1988). Importantly, the con-
structed niches also feedback on, and influence,
the behaviors of the niche-constructing
organisms.
In the human context, niche construction is a
process by which we adjust our environment to
such a degree that we create our own selection
pressures, resulting in distinct adaptations.
Constructing niches that are focused on market
defense versus prospecting, for example, can
select for a diverging set of organizational
norms that emphasize the value of congruent
behaviors and styles, such as risk aversion at
the cost of exploratory innovation. From this per-
spective, one can use evolutionary mechanisms
to model how agents modify the organizational
environment and which adaptations are likely
to emerge.
The recursive process involves agents re-
sponding to fitness-relevant problems posed by
their environments and also setting themselves
new problems through niche construction. For
instance, niche orientations that emphasize the
interests of a singular shareholder group versus
multiple stakeholder groups can have down-
stream consequences on the preferential selec-
tion of organizational traits (e.g., Donaldson &
Preston, 1995). Specifically, Campbell (2007) has
argued that constructing a shareholder-oriented
niche can create coordination problems associ-
ated with short-term horizons and unsustainable
practices. This, in turn, creates new selection pres-
sures favoring perhaps a more sustainable, stake-
holder-focused orientation. NCT thus treats evo-
lutionary change as resulting in part from
agents codirecting their own evolution (Laland,
Odling-Smee, & Feldman, 2000; Lewontin, 1983;
Odling-Smee, Laland, & Feldman, 2003).
The logic of NCT has long figured in the orga-
nizational behavior and management literature.
Graen (1975), for example, noted proactive role
making as a missing element in role theory. In
job design, a similar idea—job crafting—has
denoted the tendency of employees to actively
shape their jobs (Clegg & Spencer, 2007; Grant,
2007; Nicholson, 2010). In the careers literature,
Van Maanen and Schein (1979) coined the term
role innovation to capture a related concept,
which later became a central element in the
analysis of role transitions and the reshaping of
work environments (Nicholson, 1984). Sociolo-
gists have also favored the idea of “structura-
tion,” capturing the interaction between people
and institutional structures (Orlikowski, 1992).
Much organizational development can be
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viewed through the NCT lens, such as firms
shifting gears in terms of technology, product
innovation, staffing criteria, and selection
processes.
NCT’s strength is in identifying how modifica-
tions to a niche, such as a shift in management
orientation, lead to the emergence of adaptive
traits and strategies favored in the selective en-
vironment over time (Laland, Odling-Smee, &
Feldman, 2001; Laland, Odling-Smee, & Myles,
2010; Odling-Smee, 1988; Rendell, Fogarty, & La-
land, 2011). A primary factor contributing to the
progression of human niche construction is our
ability to acquire and transmit information
quickly through culture (Laland et al., 2000). Rel-
ative to genetic inheritance, cultural inheritance
can have a more immediate and profound influ-
ence on the selective environment because cul-
turally inherited information is not bound by
purely genetic pathways for transmission. This
means that leadership can rapidly construct a
niche through cultural mechanisms.
Scholars have long argued that an essential
role of leadership is to shape and oversee the
development of organizational culture (e.g., Kai-
ser, Hogan, & Craig, 2008; Schein, 1985). For ex-
ample, formal leadership in an organization
may decide to construct a flatter organizational
environment. This constructed niche will in-
crease the fitness value and frequency of spe-
cific organizational traits, such as democratic
normative beliefs and associated behaviors (see
Haley & Sidanius, 2005). Yet, to continue with
this example, a flatter structure with democratic
norms may not provide the most advantageous
outcome in markets that reward problem-
solving speed over problem-solving quality,
which tend to favor hierarchical networks (see
Mihm, Loch, Wilkinson, & Huberman, 2010). This
subsequently reintroduces pressure on formal
leadership to enact further niche modifica-
tions—in this example, restoring some hierar-
chical processes—to remain adaptive. Accu-
rately representing this feedback loop between
leadership and the organizational niche helps
expose the intended and unintended effects
of coordinated behavior on organizational
development.
Importantly, our model does not assume that
all coordinated behavior is caused by leader-
ship. Operational rules, norms, and shared mo-
tives—sometimes called “substitutes for leader-
ship” (Howell & Dorfman, 1981)—are additional
sources of coordination. Yet the efficacy of lead-
ership as a solution to coordination challenges
derives from its ability to successfully promote
the execution of these alternatives. As an exam-
ple, having a fraction of agents in a group will-
ing to lead the enforcement of prosocial norms—
even at a personal cost— can significantly
enhance the effectiveness of coordination
(Bowles & Gintis, 2004; Gintis, 2000). In this man-
ner some form of coercive leadership advocat-
ing affiliative norms can reinforce the observed
link between prosocial behavior and organiza-
tional commitment (Grant, Dutton, & Rosso,
2008). Leadership is therefore a central principle
of organization because it both initiates and fa-
cilitates effective coordination.
COORDINATION AND THE FOUNDATIONS
OF MODERN LEADERSHIP
To appreciate the role of leadership in niche
construction, we briefly consider the evolution-
ary origins of the agricultural revolution. Under-
standing the emergence of formal leadership
and how it has been applied to solve problems
in groups potentially increases our foresight
about future organizational evolution. The ori-
gins of modern civilization were triggered by
climatic oscillations during the tail end of the
Pleistocene, circa 11,000 years ago, which de-
pleted the resource base and intensified recur-
rent coordination problems, such as decisions
about group movement and intergroup and in-
tragroup conflict (Richerson et al., 2001). These
pressures demanded increasingly sophisticated
coordination, and existing leadership tenden-
cies were refined and expanded to solve this
problem (Flannery, 1968).
Prior to agriculture, hunter-gatherers main-
tained egalitarian leadership regimes, which
have been referred to as “reversed dominance
hierarchies” (Boehm, 1993), denoting a power-
sharing model with flexible leadership and the
censoring of what Boehm calls “upstartism.”
Postagricultural forms differed greatly, some re-
taining low-power models of leadership, such as
the highly collectivist lifestyle of pastoralists
(Nicholson, 2005), whereas others—precursors of
modern corporate cultures—enabled elaborate
resource-based stratification to evolve as a re-
sponse to the new opportunity to accrue and
inherit resources, power, and wealth (e.g., Kirch,
1984; Service, 1975). This facility, in the context of
294 AprilAcademy of Management Review
fixed settlements, spawned larger and poten-
tially more varied kinds of social networks. In-
creasing social complexity ushered in a new set
of adaptive challenges (O’Brien & Laland, 2012).
Human niches that arose during the agricultural
revolution required leadership that not only
could manage such essential activities as re-
source acquisition, distribution, and protection
but also could resolve an increasing number of
coordination dilemmas, such as managing
large-scale conflict within groups and between
groups. Table 1 shows the niche construction
trajectory from the emergence of large-scale for-
mal leadership in the agricultural revolution to
the global leadership of the modern era.
Defining Formal Leadership
Leadership as an adaptive process for solving
these dilemmas comprises active agents who
modify culture, initiate niche construction, and
alter future environments—what scholars refer
to as “ecological inheritance” (Odling-Smee,
1988; Odling-Smee & Laland, 2011). The key dif-
ference between humans and other species,
even the closest primates, is the self-conscious
intentionality in our niche construction. It is hu-
mans’ overwhelming sense of agency, purpose,
expectation, and planning that forms the cogni-
tive roots of the niche construction we call “cul-
ture building” (Nicholson, 2011).
Leadership supports niche construction
through directed coordination of individual ac-
tivities to support the pursuit of joint goals (Hol-
lander, 1992; van Vugt et al., 2008), where “coor-
dination” is defined as “joint interactions that
are ‘self-policing’ because payoffs are highest if
everyone does the same thing” (Richerson, Boyd,
& Henrich, 2003: 358). However, as group size
increased across human evolutionary history,
genetic relatedness among individuals’ de-
creased, thus enlarging the need for formal
leadership to maintain cohesion. The underly-
ing reason for this increased formality is the
nepotistic tendency to favor genetically related
others (Hamilton, 1964; Neyer & Lang, 2003). This
can hinder large-scale, loosely related coordina-
tion as incentives splinter and resource compe-
tition between organizational subgroups inten-
sifies (Ren et al., 2008). Thus, formal leadership
is a mechanism for maintaining adaptive levels
of cohesion between increasingly unrelated
group members to enhance the relative fitness
of an organization. This makes large-scale for-
mal leadership an essential component to coor-
dinate the behavior of loosely related groups in
competitive organizational environments.
Prerequisite Adaptations
Adapting to complex and dynamic environ-
ments in large-scale social groups requires a
flexible coordination strategy that is not tuned
to any specific environment (Bergstrom, 2002).
Leadership, as an evolving process, offers this
flexibility across a varied organizational land-
scape. It is able to serve equally the battle for
market share, the cultivation of prosocial hu-
man resource management, and the explora-
tion of entrepreneurial opportunities (Zahra &
Pearce, 1990). In modern times, various styles,
such as transformational, transactional, or
stewardship paradigms, have emerged to en-
act distinctive coordinating strategies to solve
specific group problems (Bass, 1997; Davis et
al., 1997; Houghton & Yoho, 2005).
TABLE 1
Leadership Evolution from the Agricultural Revolution to the Modern Era
Organizational Properties Agricultural Revolution Industrial Revolution Modern Era







Niche characteristics  Nested structure
 Division of labor
 Hierarchical
 Centralized
 Per capita subsistence
living
 Emergence of middle class
 Emergence of modern unions
 Per capita growth
 Globally diverse executives
 Flatter
 Decentralized
 Global middle class growth
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In addition to flexible large-scale coordina-
tion, another component necessary for the devel-
opment of postagrarian niches is rapid learning,
to ensure that group members know and play
their part. Humans, and to a limited degree
other primates, learn culturally—imitating oth-
ers and transmitting knowledge within and be-
tween generations (Tennie, Call, & Tomasello,
2009). Because of this ability, we have been re-
ferred to as “the ultimate niche constructors”
(Odling-Smee et al., 2003: 28).
To execute large-scale niche construction in
competitive social environments, learning the
rules for coordination is paramount. Formal
leadership addresses this concern by increasing
the pace of cultural transmission through di-
rected social learning, rather than by relying on
individuals to separately adopt their own mod-
els, which can decrease relative group cohesion.
Specifically, formalized leadership interacts
with culture to institutionalize norms and pro-
mote uniform enculturation. This is an outcome
that is especially desired in modern organiza-
tions, which typically comprise unrelated group
members who bring their own potentially divi-
sive normative beliefs and practices into the
collective. Mentors, educators, and advisers are
roles that support the leadership goals of encul-
turation and niche construction.
THE MODEL: LEADERSHIP AND
NICHE CONSTRUCTION
Evidence for the importance of flexible lead-
ership and cultural learning in human social
evolution is compelling. It is both fascinating
and helpful to understand what initially al-
lowed us to cross the threshold from informal
leadership into formal, less genetically related
leadership, given that (1) natural selection fo-
cuses primarily on the individual level (Wil-
liams, 1966) yet (2) large-scale formalized lead-
ership in loosely related social networks
typically involves an asymmetric payoff favor-
ing the leader (i.e., a relative cost to the individ-
ual follower; Hammerstein, 2003). A related
question concerns why formal leadership was
able to stabilize in human culture, rather than
humans simply resuming a hunter-gatherer life-
style when environmental pressures eased,
given the potential fitness costs associated with
transitioning to large-scale groups (Mummert,
Esche, Robinson, & Armelagos, 2011)? Finally,
why did these increasingly formal leadership
strategies evolve into the modern structures we
currently observe, and what does this imply for
future organizational evolution?
It is becoming increasingly clear that embed-
ded in these decision-making processes are the
basic mechanisms of evolution, which tend to
work on a subconscious level and fully account
for apparently nonrational choice (Aktipis &
Kurzban, 2004; Bentley, O’Brien, & Brock, 2014).
Regardless of whether the pressure is coming
from the natural environment or from an organi-
zational niche constructed by leadership, there
will exist the same continuing and observable
cycle of variation, inheritance, and selection. In-
corporating this logic into the study of organiza-
tional behavior generates a clear set of propo-
sitions for analyzing and predicting change
over time.
Leadership Propositions
To construct our model, we first consider why
and when agents sacrifice immediate self-
interest for the sake of the group, even when
payoffs gained from the sacrifice asymmetri-
cally favor the leader. Multilevel selection the-
ory deals with the inherent dilemma between
self and group when entering loosely related,
post-hunter-gatherer niches. Quite simply, if
competition between groups is stronger than
competition within groups, adaptations benefit-
ing the group will emerge (e.g., Sober & Wilson,
1998). A version relevant to the study of organi-
zations is referred to as “cultural group selec-
tion” (Henrich, 2004). The term followership in-
vestment (Spisak et al., 2011) can then be used to
capture this self/group trade-off and the oppor-
tunity it provides for formal large-scale organi-
zational practices to evolve.
The act of following can be considered an
investment of capital, energy, time, or anything
else that is a potential cost to an individual in
order to accomplish organizational goals. This
form of large-scale, asymmetric coordinated in-
vestment is possible only if (1) there is a prevail-
ing between-group pressure relative to within-
group pressure, such as market competition,
and (2) the perceived return on followership in-
vestment is sufficient to increase the fitness of
both the group and its individual members. Any
form of loosely related, large-scale coordination
without these basic rules of multilevel return on
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investment would revert to a more primitive
dominance hierarchy where a leader’s power
was absolute and coordination coerced, gener-
ally with minimal benefit to other group mem-
bers (Wilson, van Vugt, & O’Gorman, 2008).
The payoffs, however, are perceived, of
course. Therefore, individuals may suspend im-
mediate self-interest, despite the absence of a
clear long-term payoff. The general need to be-
long (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), for example,
can encourage followership investment in the
group far beyond what appears to be rational.
Withholding this fundamental need for social-
ity would constitute a cost on followers such
that going it alone would not be an option. The
Machiavellian tactic by some leaders of artifi-
cially raising the level of perceived external
threat to an organization is another approach
that can elicit an apparently irrational level of
followership investment. Finally, the presence
of actual market competition can also drive this
group-level participation. The central idea is
that multiple group-level pressures can encour-
age followership investment, and studying
these factors will add to our understanding of
organizational involvement and large-scale
coordination.
Proposition 1: Followers will be more
likely to pursue organizational goals,
even at a personal cost to immediate
self-interested goals, when within-
group (i.e., individual-level) perceived
competition is relatively less than be-
tween-group (i.e., group-level) per-
ceived competition.
This adds a worthwhile multilevel dimension
to existing motivational theories, such as expec-
tancy theory (Vroom, 1964). Specifically, by in-
cluding the group-level variable, Proposition 1
predicts that employee motivation can remain
high, even when the valence of the expected
(individual-level) outcome is negative, provided
that the costs and benefits associated with per-
ceived between-group competition are of
greater value than the costs and benefits as-
signed to within-group competition.
Although Proposition 1 provides the rationale
for large-scale niche construction, it does little
to explain how various leadership processes
stabilize (i.e., sustain followership investment
and become resistant to change). Research has
shown that firms battling for market share in
highly competitive markets can sustain a high
level of performance with weak “dictatorship”
governance, whereas firms not facing intense
market competition perform better with good
“democratic” governance (Giroud & Mueller,
2011). Similarly, as Pierce and White (1999, 2006)
noted in nonhuman primate and human studies,
status-based dominance hierarchies stabilize in
ecologies where resources are highly contested
(i.e., clustered, predictable, and visible), but
egalitarian structures emerge where resources
are less contested (i.e., dispersed, unpredict-
able, and concealed).
We know that followers hold implicit leadership
prototypes based on a variety of these evolution-
arily consistent group dynamics (e.g., Spisak et al.,
2011). Such fitness-relevant coordination prob-
lems can include not only the battle for market
share but the need for effective intragroup coor-
dination (e.g., through human resource manage-
ment practices), intergroup coordination (e.g.,
the management of postmerger integration), and
the recurrent dilemma between exploration and
exploitation. The main point is that specific co-
ordination problems need to be solved in order
to maintain a relative level of organizational
fitness. Moreover, as we noted in relation to the
adaptive strategies of preagricultural groups,
context-specific leadership processes are se-
lected and stabilized in order to address diverg-
ing coordination problems. One of the differ-
ences with modern organizational niche
construction, however, is that coordination chal-
lenges intensify when group members are unre-
lated and diverse. This spurs the evolution and
stabilization of more formalized leadership pro-
cesses with the capacity to facilitate large-scale
niche construction.
Specifically, the personal cost associated with
followership investment in unrelated groups,
combined with a tendency to be self-interested,
creates a high level of investment risk (e.g.,
cheaters may shirk group-level responsibility or
leaders may attempt to exploit followers). Com-
mon to all coordination problems and subse-
quent niche construction in loosely related
groups is the need to find an adaptive balance
between individual-level investment and group-
level payoff. Low relative payoffs in competitive
environments can threaten organizational fit-
ness. This places a premium on the ability to
construct a niche that can stabilize adaptive
coordination at a higher level than in competitor
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organizations. Understanding how leadership
processes stabilize and facilitate fitness-en-
hancing niche construction is the next step in
explaining the evolution of leadership.
The logic of what have been called the three
Rs of human cooperation—reciprocation, retri-
bution, and reputation (e.g., Boyd & Richerson,
1992, 2009; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Trivers, 1971)—
can be used to help explain how various forms
of formal leadership can occur. Once niche con-
struction begins in an organization, formal lead-
ership must emerge and deploy control mecha-
nisms capable of eliciting the desired norm
conformity. A basic requirement for achieving
stability is ensuring that the perceived cost of
not following a norm is greater than the cost of
following it. This we define as “organizational
niche equilibrium.” It is a situation where the
costs of followers switching to available alter-
natives are too great and the benefits too little,
so the niche stabilizes. This can be achieved
through various forms of the three Rs.
Take, for instance, the construction of hierar-
chical versus flat organizational structures to
address coordination problems. Management,
working to construct a flatter, cooperative niche,
needs to maintain reciprocal relationships with
multiple subgroups and individuals across the
organization. This will likely select for a proso-
cial leadership process consisting of emotional
empathy and other affiliative traits to support
multiple streams of reciprocity. The construction
of a hierarchical niche, in contrast, creates a
rank order of agents where breaches of reciproc-
ity with those lower in rank, such as frontline
employees, are likely to occur. Here costly retri-
bution for not following the hierarchical norm
may be used to achieve niche stability. Typi-
cally, this happens because payoffs asymmetri-
cally favor those at the apex of hierarchies,
rather than reciprocity governing exchanges at
all levels (Hammerstein, 2003). A constructed
niche of this kind will arguably select for a dom-
inance leadership process that encourages vig-
orous methods of status acquisition and mainte-
nance, such as aggressive behavior and
Machiavellian tactics. In this example we see the
beginnings of niche construction, where influen-
tial stakeholders such as executives and owners
modify the environment in an attempt to increase
the likelihood of success. The changed context
subsequently selects for niche-specific leadership
processes to sustain niche equilibrium.
Once established, organizational niches se-
lect for relevant and valued characteristics
among agents that confer on them reputational
and material benefits. For example, a company
defending markets compared to one with a pros-
pector orientation (Miles & Snow, 1978) will ac-
cord different value to risk-taking behaviors. Ad-
hering to these niche-specific norms associated
with success can consequently add to a positive
reputation, increase status, attract cooperation,
and ultimately enhance fitness.
Proposition 2: Given group-level invest-
ment (Proposition 1), organizational
niche construction will stabilize under
the following conditions: (a) niche con-
struction selects for niche-specific for-
mal leadership processes that favor
varying degrees of reciprocity versus
retribution to sustain followership in-
vestment; (b) the selected process is con-
tingent on the level of asymmetric pay-
off between agents embedded in the
niche (e.g., low asymmetry  increased
reciprocal strategies); and (c) niche-spe-
cific leadership receives higher reputa-
tional value (e.g., flat niche  prosocial
leadership  high reputation).
We argue that this underlying logic for sustain-
ing followership investment and managing self/
group payoffs applies to all forms of organiza-
tional niche construction.
What the stabilization process identified in
Proposition 2 does not do, however, is account
for the actual modification and evolution of
large-scale formalized leadership over time. An
additional step is required to explain the wide
variety of leadership processes and niche types
visible in the organizational landscape. As with
all evolutionary mechanisms, stable variation of
multiple competing equilibria, such as hierar-
chical versus flat structures, is required for se-
lection (Boyd & Richerson, 2009). “Multiple equi-
libria” means that diverging niche construction
gives rise to diverse leadership processes that
can become sufficiently stable (i.e., resistant to
change) to engage in competitive between-
group selection. It is at this point where NCT,
with its emphasis on downstream behavioral
consequences, is perhaps most analytically
useful.
Machiavellian-type leaders, for instance, as a
result of self-interest, may attempt to sustain
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asymmetric payoffs by exploiting followers’
bounded rationality and emotions. Management
can signal high levels of explicit concern for
corporate social responsibility, in order to ap-
pear prosocial, while internal business prac-
tices remain nonreciprocating and “easily de-
coupled,” continuing to serve the implicit
financial and strategic goals of executives and
dominant shareholders (e.g., Weaver, Treviño, &
Cochran, 1999). Indeed, managing followers’
emotions is an essential part of the leadership
process (Antonakis, Ashkanasy, & Dasborough,
2009), which can potentially include the use of
prosocial “window dressing” as a means to cre-
ate positive affect. However, we also predict that
most forms of asymmetric payoff will have lim-
its and will self-regulate to more symmetrical
equilibria because of the cumulative nature of
cultural learning. Agents will come to recognize
the harmful downstream consequences of their
excessive self-interested behaviors and attempt
to initiate and stabilize fitness-enhancing alter-
natives. Gross asymmetries embedded in a
niche can quickly become unstable, requiring
modifications to the niche for it to remain viable.
Organizations are continually developing
these alternative leadership strategies and pit-
ting them against each other in pursuit of mar-
ket viability. The capacity for innovation, for
example, is highly advantageous in many mar-
kets. Proposition 1 dictates that a sustained
level of between-group competition will elicit
group-level investment. This implies that inno-
vation is one organizational phenomenon that
creates the need for coordination. Further, Prop-
osition 2 indicates that a particular leadership
process will be needed to stabilize the require-
ments of the situation. Thus, an intense level of
market share competition would imply the con-
tingent selection of dominant, hierarchical lead-
ership to quickly establish innovative suprem-
acy. It is important to note that this kind of
competition aligns with the primate universal of
dominance hierarchy as a mechanism for
achieving individual-level success (Nichol-
son, 2013).
Innovation, however, is an example where a
leadership process based on dominance to en-
act “business warfare” can come to hinder com-
petitive viability. Agents in a hierarchically or-
ganized niche may have restricted input and/or
may not perceive a reciprocal return on their
followership investment (recall that asymmetric
payoffs typically favor those at the top) and,
therefore, may withhold a percentage of their
innovative output. Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006)
use the phrase “shadow of the future” when
discussing concerns of reciprocity over time and
its impact on innovative performance. Con-
versely, for subgroups tasked with innovation,
we suspect an advantageous alternative is for
an organization to construct a niche of coopera-
tion, rather than one of competition, by means of
a prosocial, affiliative leadership process. This
creates a flatter niche, which increases informa-
tion flow, perceived reciprocity, and ultimately
innovative output. Simply stated, constructing
an organizational niche that stabilizes around
“how well we work together,” rather than “how
well we do against other groups,” can have a
profound evolutionary effect. Proposition 2 holds
that in order to construct such a niche, organi-
zations can work to (1) ensure a sense of reci-
procity, (2) enhance the reputation of coopera-
tors, and (3) apply retribution to cheaters.
What priority is assigned to various organiza-
tional goals, such as innovation, postmerger in-
tegration, and various organizational hurdles,
depends on the importance of the challenge.
Additionally, how the organization coordinates
behavior in pursuit of these goals depends on
the type of niche construction established by
key stakeholders (e.g., decisions about hierar-
chy, division of labor, centralization, and other
pillars of organizational design; Rivkin & Sig-
gelkow, 2003). Continuing with the innovation
example, assigning priority to innovation may
induce management to construct flat structures
with a multidisciplinary division of labor in or-
der to stimulate and coordinate the processes of
invention. Leadership emerging from this ori-
entation consequently sustains the niche
through application of the three Rs, which ad-
vances niche construction in the intended di-
rection of flat and reciprocal. Again, the lead-
ership process is both a driver and product of
organizational evolution, and cultural learn-
ing rapidly transmits and stabilizes subse-
quent adaptations.
Crossing the threshold into large-scale
groups was human evolution’s “big bang.” The
ability to niche construct on a large and com-
plex scale, through the initiation and facilitation
of leadership, afforded humans the opportunity
to create more than enough stable variation to
fuel continuous organizational evolution. How
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an organization chooses to prioritize and coordi-
nate its actions relative to those of its competi-
tors forms the foundation of organizational
niche construction.
Proposition 3: Given group-level invest-
ment (Proposition 1) and the mechanisms
for constructing a stable niche (Proposi-
tion 2), large-scale formalized leadership
dynamics will evolve under the following
conditions: (a) organizations face multi-
ple coordination problems with varying
payoffs; (b) strategic alternatives are pri-
oritized to maintain relative fitness be-
tween organizations (e.g., high priority
assigned to innovation); (c) niche con-
struction trajectories (e.g., hierarchal
versus flat orientations) set by influential
stakeholders select for multiple equi-
libria of niche-specific leadership pro-
cesses (e.g., dominance versus prosocial),
which stabilize between organizations
(variation); (d) fitness-enhancing leader-
ship processes increase in frequency
by means of cultural learning (inheri-
tance), and processes with higher relative
payoffs between organizations persist
(selection); (e) group success decreases
group-level competition and increases
individual-level competition; and (f)
individual-level competition decreases
group-level fitness, which creates a feed-
back loop requiring further niche con-
struction to maintain a relative level of
organizational success (see Figure 1).
One testable prediction that can be derived
from Proposition 3 is that as group-level compe-
tition increases globally—the rise of Asian
firms, for example— group-level investment
within competing firms will increase to sustain
relative fitness. This means that asymmetric
payoffs within an organization will decrease
and prosocial leadership processes will in-
crease in frequency to secure increased levels of
reciprocity and group-level investment across
the organization. This prosocial switch will have
a cascading effect on other processes, such as
leadership emergence. Research has shown, for
instance, that followers tend to favor female
leaders in a prosocial context (e.g., van Vugt &
Spisak, 2008). Likewise, as we previously dis-
cussed, the increase in reciprocity should also
have a positive impact on the quality of innova-
tive output. Consequently, groups that success-
fully work together by enacting relatively more
adaptive leadership processes will increase the
overall fitness of each member (Sober & Wilson,
1998; Williams, 1966). Those groups, and ulti-
mately individuals, maintaining larger and
more integrated networks are likely to have
greater intragroup stability, access to scarce re-
sources, and success during intergroup compe-
FIGURE 1
An Evolutionary Cycle of Organizational
Leadership Resulting from Coordinated
Human Niche Construction
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tition. They are also more likely to pass on their
acquired knowledge through cultural learning.
Hence, large-scale formal leadership is funda-
mentally a mechanism for expanding these
adaptive organizational networks.
Implications for Leadership and
Organizational Evolution
As groups become larger and more complex,
formalized leadership maximizes the benefit of
sociality by regulating tensions between indi-
vidual- and group-level interests to ensure a
healthy level of group investment. This fitness-
enhancing advantage of formal leadership
structures then spreads throughout large-scale
societies. The reason for such ubiquity is that
formal leadership is versatile enough to provide
the global institutional foundation required to
cooperate on a large scale (e.g., maintaining
relatively equitable payoffs), as well as the local
organization necessary to prioritize and manage
specific tasks. Leadership both defines organi-
zational strategies and initiates collective ac-
tion to achieve objectives.
The Coevolution of Formal Leadership and
Cultural Niches
What we observe in the postagrarian era, not
seen before, is a compounding effect of adapta-
tion passing through larger, more complex so-
cial networks, which encourages the pathways
to increase in complexity as further niche con-
struction occurs. For example, as a result of
niche construction, the level of sustainable
group density rises and formal leadership roles
emerge with greater refinement. These are the
downstream consequences. A larger population,
as a result of niche construction, creates in-
creasingly complex networks, and subsequent
social stratification imposes structural con-
straints (i.e., formalized hierarchy)—further
downstream consequences. We suggest these
factors lead to exceptionally influential leader-
ship opportunities, such as many CEO positions.
These leadership hubs have greater access and
control over resources and, thus, become focal
points of networks.
We argue that formalized leadership in its
many forms can exercise an unprecedented de-
gree of control over network behavior and niche
construction. In essence, formal leadership pro-
vides a degree of “direction” to organizational
evolution. As social complexity increases, the
possible directions to drive niche construction
diversify (Proposition 3). Leadership’s construc-
tion of relatively more successful niches will
typically increase a group’s status, causing oth-
ers to adopt its fitness-enhancing cultural adap-
tations to remain competitive (e.g., Mesoudi,
2008). This involves cultural knowledge sweep-
ing across social networks containing multiple
organizations. In these networks various alter-
natives undergo selection and adaptive infor-
mation is transmitted. The communications sup-
porting this diffusion can range from simple
proximity, such as familial transmission in
highly related groups (e.g., Henrich & Henrich,
2010), to complex interorganizational transmis-
sion via interlocking directorates (e.g., Carpen-
ter & Westphal, 2001).
Research on firms, however, indicates that im-
itation is not costless (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006).
A formalized leadership structure creates more
centralized power, which potentially influences
the trajectory of cultural evolution toward insti-
tutionalized norms that reinforce those in cen-
tralized positions—dominant shareholders, for
instance. This presumably results from the ten-
dency to enhance individual-level success (Wil-
liams, 1966). Thus, niche construction activities
will likely include architecture designed to
asymmetrically channel benefits toward the top.
If centralized leadership in other groups begins
to adopt this self-interested strategy, then the
individual- and group-level balance necessary
to maintain formal structures is jeopardized. The
imbalance is likely to grow until the group,
including the leaders benefiting from such
asymmetry, fails. Proposition 3 states that an
important deterrent against such failure is
maintained by between-group competition (Fig-
ure 1). Thus, laws preventing monopolies and
other competition-reducing practices potentially
ensure equitable group investment and long-
term organizational fitness, even for the monop-
olizing organization.
In the context of the leadership literature, this
balancing act between individual and group in-
terests is the basis of leader-member exchange
and path-goal theories (e.g., Dienesch & Liden,
1986; House, 1971), which seek to explain why
certain maladaptive leadership traits do not
necessarily drive groups to extinction. In fact,
they rarely do (Laland & Brown, 2006). Any dis-
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parity in individual within-group fitness will
have a threshold based on perceived and actual
payoffs in competitive between-group environ-
ments so that overall group fitness cannot drop
below levels of other groups without negative
consequences for all individuals within the
group (Proposition 1). Formal leadership can
evolve to create stable hierarchical structures to
benefit group members unequally (Proposi-
tion 2), although this will be curtailed by adap-
tations for group-level investments that enable
organizations to meet the challenge of between-
group competition (Proposition 3). For example,
training and development programs are group-
level initiatives that restrict the ability of lead-
ers to pursue cronyism by increasing expert
power across the organization through knowl-
edge sharing.
The human ability to learn at a rapid pace,
togetherwithastableandcumulativetransgenera-
tional culture (Tennie et al., 2009), allows cultural
knowledge to spread through social networks.
This modifies the cultural niche and generates a
countervailing feedback pressure on formal
leadership. Thus, we observe a coevolution be-
tween leadership and niches in the pursuit of
organizational success. In this cultural space,
contrasting niche construction activities battle
for supremacy. By adjusting perceptions of costs
and benefits, competing leadership initiatives
can work to secure investments and stabilize
adaptations. Some groups might construct a hi-
erarchical niche to encourage innovation,
whereas others might stabilize a flatter struc-
ture. The goal is to focus investment and to se-
cure fitness in a competitive environment. This
drives the niche-constructing activities ob-
served across organizations.
Limitations and Future Research
Although it is clear that formal leadership can
have a significant impact on success, we con-
tinue the search to improve our model. A number
of limitations and boundary conditions exist. For
instance, as an introduction to niche construc-
tion and formal leadership emergence, the cur-
rent model would become too complex to cover
all aspects of the leadership process in one
stroke. Future versions will need to account for
emotions, personality, and other individual dif-
ferences, as well as specific cultural and ecolog-
ical variations. Such advances will increase the
accuracy of modeling the coevolutionary rela-
tionship between leadership and organizational
niches.
To encourage continued model development,
our work has a number of implications for the
direction of research in leadership and organi-
zational behavior. We have offered a framework
that connects both the social and biological per-
spectives on leadership by means of niche con-
struction. It is valuable to consider a broader
understanding of human behavior, given the in-
timate connection between biology and culture
in our species. The biological sciences, for in-
stance, provide insights into fundamental hu-
man tendencies, which help to clarify what ad-
aptations are likely to occur under different
organizational pressures, whereas the social
sciences provide information about specific or-
ganizational environments. The main point is
that incorporating niche construction into the
organizational and management sciences un-
locks a wealth of multidisciplinary research to
yield future insights.
Future work could also investigate other mod-
ifications of formal leadership resulting from
the multilevel tension embedded within posta-
grarian niches. It would be beneficial to under-
stand how pressures in the environment, such
as the rise of market competition in developing
economies, influence the evolution of institu-
tions and their leadership manifestations. We
suspect that management practices will need to
become significantly less hierarchical, domi-
nant, and homogeneous to remain successful in
an increasingly connected, informed, diverse,
and alternative-rich environment (e.g., Bentley
et al., 2014). Digital communities provide em-
ployees with an ability to maintain highly net-
worked, decentralized social links, enabling
rapid information sharing and the exploration of
opportunities on a global scale. Likewise, the
shift from nonrenewable to renewable energy
sources, as a result of an overly exploited niche,
is moving societies toward exploratory goals,
which implies a need for flatter, innovation-
friendly leadership structures.
CONCLUSIONS
In preagricultural society, dramatic shifts in
the Pleistocene natural environment selected bi-
ologically for cultural learning and leadership
(Richerson & Boyd, 2000). We propose that in-
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creased stable transgenerational knowledge in-
tensified social competition among groups and
activated group-level pressures that selected
culturally for the formalization of leadership.
This, in turn, facilitated the emergence of large-
scale organization. Niche construction in this
complex network created countless varieties of
organizational behaviors and leadership adap-
tations, which were, and continue to be, pitted
against one another in a seemingly endless
struggle. Cultural adaptations for formal lead-
ership then modified niches, adjusting cultural
practices to secure an adaptive balance be-
tween individual- and group-level benefits.
History has witnessed huge variation in lead-
ership forms, including despotic rule, transfor-
mational agents, industry bureaucrats, and
democratic representatives. We feel violated
when despots place too much emphasis on in-
dividual-level advantage, and we experience a
sense of security when our representatives work
to protect us from external threats and internal
power abuses. There is no doubt that consider-
able variation in formal leadership will persist
in the extreme diversity of modern institutional
niches. Under what circumstances is an unreg-
ulated for-profit model sustainable? Can a
highly centralized system compete with flatter
structures in the face of globalized competition?
How will cultural differences be leavened by the
shrinking geospatial effect of cyberconnectiv-
ity? Ultimately, it will be the quality of leader-
ship and the willingness and ability of followers
to execute niche construction strategies that will
dictate the success and failure of future organi-
zational forms.
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